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CLASS ACTIONS: THE RIGHT TO SOLICIT
Charles D. Schoor*
INTRODUCTION
Although the assistance of an attorney is frequently a ne-
cessity in a bureaucratic society, securing that assistance can
present obstacles as serious as the problem for which the attor-
ney is needed. Canon 2 of the American Bar Association's Code
of Professional Responsibility sets out the lawyer's duty to
"assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available."' However, the Code narrowly limits the
manner in which this obligation can be fulfilled; solicitation of
clients by attorneys is strictly prohibited.2 The restriction is
designed to minimize any connection between assisting laymen
"to recognize legal problems [that] may not be self-revealing"
and improper "personal"-presumably pecuniary-motives of
* B.S., 1968, University of Pennsylvania; M.S., 1970, University of California, Los
Angeles; J.D., 1975, University of Southern California; Member, California Bar.
The author is indebted to Professor Scot Bice of the University of Southern Cali-
fornia Law Center for his advice on earlier drafts of this article.
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2 (1971) [hereinafter the
Ethical Considerations will be cited as ABA CODE, E.C., and the Disciplinary Rules
as ABA CODE, D.R.].
ABA CODE, E.C. 2-1 (footnotes omitted) provides in part: "The need of members
of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their legal problems,
appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of
acceptable legal counsel."
2. American Bar Association Disciplinary Rules do permit a limited amount of
indirect solicitation, to the extent that attorneys are permitted to make themselves
available to and accept referrals from (1) lawyer referral services sponsored or approved
by the local bar association; (2) certain legal aid organizations; (3) a military legal
assistance office; (4) a "non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries." ABA CODE, D.R. 2-103(D). This is an
acknowledgment of and adaptation to the Supreme Court ruling in NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963), and subsequent cases dealing with solicitation in the context of
first amendment rights. See text accompanying notes 23-36. See also Belli v. State Bar,
10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974), for an analysis of the constitu-
tional considerations involved when an attorney publicizes lecture tours and other
subsidiary activities that may have the effect of promoting his private practice.
On February 17, 1976, the ABA House of Delegates voted to allow attorneys to list
in the classified section of telephone directories their initial consultation fees, credit
arrangements, and areas of specialty. ABA Press Release No. 021776 (Feb. 17, 1976).
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the attorney rendering such aid.' Thus, Ethical Consideration
2-3 asserts:
The advice [to seek legal services] is proper only if moti-
vated by a desire to protect one who does not recognize
that he may have legal problems or who is ignorant of his
legal rights or obligations. Hence the advice is improper if
motivated by a desire to obtain personal benefit, secure
personal publicity, or cause litigation to be brought merely
to harass or injure another. Obviously, a lawyer should not
contact a non-client, directly, or indirectly, for the purpose
of being retained to represent him for compensation.'
Clearly, there is opportunity for abuse if the lawyer has per-
sonal reasons for offering his legal services. But it does not
necessarily follow that this potential abuse can be prevented
only by outright prohibition of all solicitation; there may well
be other adequate safeguards.
The case against solicitation is a substantial one. Re-
cently, however, there has been some commentary on the avail-
ability and even the constitutional necessity of less restrictive
means for preventing potential abuses.' It has been argued that
the evils of solicitation can be avoided without sacrificing theincreased information and access to the courts that solicitation
would produce. Indeed, some commentators have suggested
that recent Supreme Court opinions require the invalidation of
the present broad anti-solicitation rules.
The constitutional and case law arguments for permitting
solicitation have merit; however, they involve a significant ex-
tension of the applicable Supreme Court cases. The purpose of
this article is to set forth a middle position: if the courts are
unwilling to eliminate all restrictions on solicitation, an accept-
able intermediate step would be to abolish the rules in the class
action context, an area in which existing judicial procedures
can easily be modified to curb any potential or actual miscon-
duct. In addition, this position, which may be required by the
Supreme Court cases, would provide a limited and controlled
context in which the arguments for and against solicitation
could be empirically tested. This proposal will be developed
3. ABA CODE, E.c. 2-2.
4. Id. 2-3 (emphasis added).
5. See Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys andAdvertising, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 77 (1973); Note, Advertising, Solici-
tation and the Professional Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181
(1972).
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and its feasibility examined, with analysis focusing on the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the class action rule, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The discussion is applicable to class action
litigation under the rules of the individual states to the extent
that state procedures and protections are similar to those em-
bodied in Rule 23.
I. CLASS AcrIONS
Class Actions Under Rule 23
The class action is a special kind of joinder device. It al-
lows one or more persons to sue or defend on behalf of them-
selves and all other persons similarly situated. "The unique
characteristic of a class action is that a determination made in
respect of self-constituted representatives of a group is, or at
least purports to be, binding for or against the absent members
of the group."'
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contem-
plates three different varieties of class actions. A suit can qual-
ify as a class action if it meets the prerequisite of section 23(a)
and the requirements of either 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3).1
6. D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 827 (3d ed. 1973).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately'
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
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Section 23(b)(1) permits a class action to be brought when the
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of inconsistent judgments
against the party opposing the class, or a risk of a judgment
against an individual member of the class which, as a practical
matter, would impair the rights of other class members not
party to the present suit. In these situations, the single class
action is advantageous because it eliminates any potential in-
consistency and protects the rights of all parties who will be
affected by the outcome.
Section 23(b)(2) authorizes a class action when a party
opponent has engaged in the same sort of conduct toward all
members of the class. In this situation, injunctive or declara-
tory relief for the whole class is appropriate. The class suit
allows resolution for all persons affected, without the necessity
of multiple suits on the same fact situation.
The third type of class action is authorized by section
23(b)(3). In this type of action, there are questions of fact orlaw common to the class members which predominate over any
questions affecting only the individual members, and the class
action is the best available method to adjudicate the contro-
versy.'
An analysis of the Rule 23 categories indicates that the
class action is intended to promote judicial efficiency and uni-
formity of decision. A third rationale, particularly for the
23(b)(3) action, is that the rule provides a forum to persons
whose individual claims against the defendant are too small to
litigate separately. The class action offers a remedy where there
is no practical alternative. In addition, the possibility of consol-
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the liti-
gation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.
8. For a discussion of the rationale underlying the rules and examples of the
different types of class action suits, see Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 39
F.R.D. 69, 98-104 (1966).
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idating numerous small claims deters certain types of miscon-
duct, since it provides individuals with an economically feasi-
ble method of policing. Exploitative practices which inflict
minor economic injury on a large number of people-but which
represent in the aggregate enormous gains for the wrong-
doer-can be halted by one or two individuals acting as "pri-
vate attorneys general." 9
To be sure, the "provision of forum" theory has been con-
troversial."0 The Supreme Court has determined that in the
federal courts, every class member, 1 and not just one named
plaintiff, 2 must meet any applicable jurisdictional amount
requirement, 3 on the ground that such requirements embody
a legislative policy to keep small plaintiffs out of federal court.
But in many types of cases there are no jurisdictional amount
requirements (for instance, securities, 4 antitrust,"5 and certain
civil rights actions 6). The argument from legislative silence is
always a risky one at best, but presumably the absence of a
jurisdictional amount requirement in such cases indicates no
legislative policy against the small-claim plaintiff, and offers
a field of operation for the Rule 23(b)(3) class action.
Reasons to Encourage Solicitation
In order to determine whether solicitation of class actions
is desirable, it is necessary, first, to determine whether solicita-
9. For a discussion of use of the class action to deter corporate wrongdoing, see
Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS ACTION REP. 47
(1973). The usefulness of the private attorney general rationale, in both class and
individual actions, has been seriously impaired by the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975). The
Court's decision that, in the federal courts, attorneys' fees will be available to success-
ful plaintiffs on a private attorney general theory only if specifically provided for by
statute may increase the economic squeeze and discourage policing actions by consum-
ers. See Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litigation Survive?, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 267 (1975). However, plaintiffs whose class action suits result in sub-
stantial damage awards in which other class members are entitled to share will usually
be reimbursed for attorneys' fees under the "common fund" doctrine. Id. at 274; see
text accompanying note 53 infra.
10. For a discussion of the emergence of this third purpose and its potential
conflict with the purposes of efficiency and uniformity of decision, see Weithers,
Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 515
(1969).
11. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
12. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
13. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
14. 15 id. § 78aa.
15. 28 id. § 1337.
16. Id. § 1343.
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tion would interfere with the apparent purposes for class ac-
tions (judicial economy, uniformity of decision, and provision
of forum); and second, whether the nature of the class action
makes it a peculiarly appropriate context for solicitation. 7
There are three basic kinds of solicitation in regard to class
actions: solicitation of the entire suit, including the first named
plaintiff; solicitation of additional named plaintiffs for a class
action that has already been initiated; and solicitation of direct
representation of an unnamed member of an existing class ac-
tion.
With regard to the latter two types of solicitation, the so-
licited plaintiffs would be class members even if they had not
been induced to become named plaintiffs or accept direct rep-
resentation. They would be in the forum and bound by the
judgment, unless they chose to opt out where such a choice was
available. 8 No new suits would be brought as a consequence of
solicitation, and no separate suits would be consolidated. The
effect of these kinds of solicitation on judicial economy, uni-
formity of decision and forum provision would be small.
The effects of solicitation would be most direct and ob-
vious when the entire action, including the first named plain-
tiff, is solicited-a situation that resembles solicitation of an
individual suit. For purposes of analysis, we can divide these
class actions into three categories: those suits that would not
have been brought at all without the solicitation; those suits
that would have been brought individually if the class action
were not solicited; and those that would have been brought as
class actions in any event.
As to those suits that would not have been brought at all,
economy, in the sense of overall costs, is certainly not enhanced
by encouraging litigation that would otherwise not occur. In
addition, solicitation of these suits would not contribute to
consistent application and development of the law, because by
definition, no decisions would have been forthcoming. But
there is a more important question: why would these suits not
have been brought? If it is because the potential plaintiff was
unaware of his rights, then surely no policy of keeping persons
uninformed can be offered in support of the anti-solicitation
17. For statements of the existing arguments for advertising and solicitation in
the general case, see comments cited note 5 supra.




rule. On the contrary, the ABA's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility imposes on attorneys an ethical duty to increase the
level of rights-awareness in the general public. 9 Solicitation
would encourage such awareness. If the suit would not have
been brought because the potential plaintiff did not want to
litigate (for reasons other than the cost of litigating), exposing
him to an honest presentation of the arguments in favor of legal
action should not be barred. Litigation of justifiable claims is
not, of itself, an evil. The potential plaintiff obviously cannot
be compelled to accept the advice to litigate; solicitation would
merely make him aware of an alternative course and, again,
encourage rights-awareness. Finally, if the suit would not have
been brought because the costs would be too high in light of the
possible or probable recovery, solicitation would operate in di-
rect support of the provision-of-forum purpose of class actions.
Solicitation of class actions that would not have been
brought otherwise does increase litigation in the courts. But in
evaluating the desirability of the alternatives, we must con-
sider the basic goals of a judicial system. As discussed more
fully subsequently,2" reduction of the costs of a court system
should be secondary to the redress of justifiable grievances.2'
In the case of class suits that would have been brought as
individual suits if the class action were not solicited, judicial
economy would probably be served and consistent adjudica-
tions promoted, because solicitation would encourage the liti-
gants to join in one action. The accessability of a forum would
neither be increased nor decreased, but cost to litigants would
be reduced by the economies of scale.
Finally, there are the cases in which a class action would
have been brought even without solicitation. Here, the pur-
19. "The legal profession should assist laymen to recognize legal problems be-
cause such problems may not be self revealing and often are not timely noticed." ABA
CODE, E.C. 2-2.
20. See text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
21. It should be noted that increase of rights-awareness and stimulation of infor-
mation flow would be encouraged by solicitation, whether it be solicitation of class or
individual actions, but the increase in access to the forum would be much more exten-
sive in class actions. Those who will benefit most from the freer flow of information
are those who do not have regular access to an attorney; these people are usually the
poor and the middle class whose claims tend to be relatively small. The costs of
litigation will usually prevent these people from individually bringing suit, even if they
are aware of their rights. Solicitation would inform these people of their rights, and
the class action would provide them with access to a forum where their claims can be
economically adjudicated.
1976]
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poses of the class action rule" clearly would be served in any
event, and permitting solicitation would offer only the addi-
tional advantage that solicitation might provide in individual
suits: increased rights-awareness, freer flow of information and,
perhaps, lower prices for legal services because of increased
competition. But there is a bonus: the special protections of the
class action rule offer built-in protection against abuses that
might go unregulated in the solicitation of individual actions.
Thus, there are several reasons to encourage solicitation of
class actions; three of them-increased rights-awareness, freer
access to information, and price competition-are equally valid
in the context of the individual suit. But solicitation of class
actions has an additional advantage in that it spreads the ben-
efits to a larger proportion of the population and promotes an
economical method of redress. Futhermore, recent Supreme
Court cases indicate the anti-solicitation rules may under cer-
tain circumstances violate first amendment rights. These cases
have particular significance in a group context, where the right
to assemble augments and is interwoven with free speech
rights. And finally, the federal class action rule can be used to
prevent those potential evils and abuses most frequently cited
as likely to result from any relaxation of the current anti-
solicitation rules. These last two factors, peculiar to the class
action situation, will now be analyzed in detail.
II. SOLICITATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has held that some kinds of solicita-
tion are protected by the first amendment.23 In a series of four
decisions beginning with NAACP v. Button, 4 the Court has
upheld the right of certain associations to contact individuals"5
about possible litigation and to direct these potential litigants
to attorneys recommended or actually employed by the asso-
ciation.
In Button, the Court struck down a Virginia statute which
was construed to prohibit the NAACP from advising prospec-
tive litigants that their legal rights had been infringed, and
from referring them to the NAACP legal offices for representa-
22. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
23. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
24. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
25. In Button, the NAACP directed their solicitation toward both NAACP mem-
bers and non-members. Id. at 422.
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tion. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel
Virginia State Bar,2" the Court found a violation of the first and
fourteenth amendments in an injunction which restrained the
Brotherhood from advising injured workers to seek out legal
representation and from recommending particular attorneys to
them. A third case, United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois
State Bar Association,27 upheld a union's right to hire its own
attorney to prosecute workmen's compensation claims and to
provide injured workers with forms which they were advised to
submit to the union's legal department. The forms constituted
authorization for the union's attorney to file a claim on behalf
of the injured workman. Finally, in United Transportation
Union v. State Bar of Michigan," the Court upheld a union's
right to recommend specific attorneys to its members. The
recommended attorneys had agreed with the union that they
would prosecute FELA 9 claims for a fee totaling no more than
25 percent of the recovery.
In each of these cases, the Court held that no compelling
state interest could be found to support anti-solicitation regu-
lations which infringed on fundamental first amendment rights
of speech and association. As each succeeding case came before
the Court, the state bar involved attempted to narrowly distin-
guish the preceding cases on their facts. But the Supreme
Court refused to read the holdings narrowly. In United Mine
Workers, the Court specifically held that Button was not lim-
ited to litigation concerned with political expression, and that
the Trainmen rule was not limited to the recommendation of
specific outside attorneys but encompassed the right of an or-
ganization to hire its own attorney and then recommend that
attorney to its members.3
In United Transportation Union, the Court announced the
broad principles involved:
In the context of this case we deal with a cooperative union
of workers seeking to assist its members in effectively as-
serting claims under the FELA. But the principle here
involved cannot be limited to the facts of this case. At issue
is the basic right to group legal action, a right first asserted
in this Court by an association of Negroes seeking the pro-
26. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
27. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
28. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
29. Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1970).
30. 389 U.S. at 221.
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tection of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. The
common thread running through our decisions in NAACP
v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that
collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access
to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
of the First Amendment. However, that right would be a
hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers
or others the means of enabling their members to meet the
costs of legal representation. That was the holding in
United Mine Workers, Trainmen, and NAA CP v. Button.'
There has been commentary which utilizes the Button se-
ries of cases to suggest that the principles involved are
applicable to situations in which individuals rather than spe-
cial groups are the solicitors.2 One commentator argues that
collective activity is not the key to the holdings." The fact is,
however, that in the cases decided thus far, association to ob-
tain access to the courts has been a central element. Certainly,
an individual's need for increased access to the courts does not
depend on whether he is a member of a group. But in the
evolution of constitutional rights, there may be reasons for
making this type of distinction-reasons which led the court to
focus on the right of association of the potential litigants, and
not on the associational rights of the attorney and his prospec-
tive clients.
In the course of its several opinions, the Court looked at
both the first amendment interests to be protected and the
interests of the state in regulating solicitation. The state inter-
ests were found not sufficient to justify the broad prohibitions
at issue. Justice Harlan, dissenting in United Mine Workers,
characterized the Court's comparison of the state's interests
with the association's interests as a balancing process, and dis-
tinguished this from the "absolute" approach in first amend-
ment cases that some members of the court had taken in the
past.34 Justice Harlan found himself in agreement with the bal-
ancing approach, but not with the result: he argued that the
state's interests justified the prohibition.
If the Court was indeed weighing the states' interests in
anti-solicitation rules against the litigants' interest in im-
31. 401 U.S. at 585-86 (emphasis added).
32. See comments cited note 5 supra.
33. Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and
Advertising, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 87 (1973).
34. 389 U.S. at 227.
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proved access to the courts, then the importance of the group
aspect of the decisions may, perhaps, be found by focusing on
the states' interests rather than those of prospective plaintiffs.
The Court, divided as it was, may have been reluctant to aban-
don entirely rules prohibiting solicitation, and have sought in-
stead, in the group context, an alternative means for achieving
the states' interests while still undercutting the traditional so-
licitation ban.
This appears more clearly when we examine the purposes
of the solicitation and the nature of the group in each of the
cases. In Button, the soliciting group was the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People. The Court stated
that the basic aims and purposes of the NAACP were "to se-
cure the elimination of all racial barriers which deprive Negro
citizens of the privileges and burdens of equal citizenship rights
in the United States."35 The NAACP was soliciting black citi-
zens to serve as litigants in cases involving racial discrimina-
tion and school integration. In each of the other three cases, the
soliciting group was a labor union. The broad purpose of this
solicitation was to provide injured union members with the
opportunity to obtain more effective legal aid in pressing their
claims for compensation. Thus, in all four cases the group func-
tioned, in effect, as a service organization for its members, the
persons being solicited. The raison d'etre of the soliciting group
was to increase its members' ability to achieve common inter-
ests.
The Supreme Court may have viewed the group as imple-
menting the interests of both the potential litigants and the
state. On the one hand, the group provided the increased access
to the courts which solicitation would promote and which the
group desired; on the other, it stood ready to protect its mem-
bers from abuses of solicitation. It was in the association's own
self interest to provide quality legal services and to assure that
its members were not subjected to fraudulent practices. This
perhaps explains the Court's conclusion in each case that the
value of the solicitation activities outweighed the state's inter-
est in enforcing its anti-solicitation rules: the group itself pro-
vided the protection and regulation that was the essence of the
interest asserted by the state. Metaphorically, the existence of
the group was not so much an added weight on the litigants'
35. 371 U.S. at 419.
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side of the balance as a decrease on the state's side. Where
there exists an efficient protective mechanism without state
intervention, it is perhaps more difficult for the state to estab-
lish that its need to safeguard solicitees is indeed compelling.
This would further explain why the Court announced the first
amendment rights in terms of "collective activity undertaken
to obtain meaningful access to the courts."36 It would also pro-
vide a divided court with an opportunity to experiment with
limited solicitation practices before determining whether broad
anti-solicitation rules are in fact necessary to implement a le-
gitimate state interest in the public welfare.
How, then, does solicitation of a class action by a private
attorney fit into this structure?
In the solicitation of class actions, the potential litigants
have common interests which can be fostered by the formation
of a group, just as those litigants in the Button line of cases did.
But there is frequently no sufficient incentive for anyone to
form an "association," particularly when each potential liti-
gant's claim is small. The common interest of the group is
temporary and discrete; the existence of a common interest
group may well be unknown to most of its members; and the
sole reason for an association would be to pursue one particular
law suit. Unlike a labor union or the NAACP, the association
would cease to exist once litigation was completed.
The soliciting attorney, however, does stand to benefit
from the effort to form an association. His incentive is the fee,
which will frequently exceed any single plaintiffs claim. When
an attorney solicits a class action he is in effect attempting to
form an association which, although amorphous and tempo-
rary, will nevertheless resemble, in its "common interest"
focus, the labor union in the Supreme Court cases. Of course,
in the solicitation of a class action, the attorney's interests do
not usually coincide with those of the class, and he clearly does
not have the kind of interest that the labor unions did in pro-
tecting group members from abuses of solicitation. But in the
case of a class action, this protective function can be achieved
independently. The strictures of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, together with the broad supervisory powers
it confers on the courts, make the class action rule an excellent




mechanism for ensuring that the state's obligation to protect
the potential solicitee is discharged.
If the Supreme Court is not yet ready to extend first
amendment protection to all types of solicitation activities-if
it chooses, rather, to tread this path one step at a time-then
solicitation of class actions is the next logical step. It imple-
ments the rationale of the Button line of cases while achieving
a proper balance between freer information flow and preven-
tion of abuses.
III. THE EFFECTS OF SOLICITATION AND THE PREVENTION OF
ABUSES
What are the dangers presented by solicitation, and how
does the class action rule protect against these dangers? A
useful way to evaluate the anti-solicitation arguments is to
examine the alleged detrimental effects of solicitation on the
various parties involved. The process reveals that reasonable
arguments in favor of solicitation become still stronger in the
context of a class action governed by Rule 23, and that some
potential ill effects are obviated either by the protections made
available under the rule, or by the nature of the class action
itself. The effects on plaintiffs, defendants, courts, the legal
profession, and the general public are discussed separately."
Plaintiffs
Rule 23(a)(4): The "puffing" problem. Rules prohibiting
solicitation are often defended as offering potential clients pro-
tection against misrepresentation. 8 It is assumed that a lawyer
soliciting a client will be more likely to overstate his ability
(called "puffing") and accept a case he cannot competently
manage than a lawyer who is sought out by a client. Puffing
may result in increased costs for overvalued services, and meri-
torious claims may be defeated because of unskillful handling.
In addition, the image and dignity of the profession suffer.
The Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes that
the selection of an attorney was an easier task in the past, when
37. Because this article is concerned primarily with solicitation of class actions,
the discussion of solicitation practices focuses on the litigation context. Non-litigation
solicitation, e.g., clients solicited for estate planning or for periodic legal "checkups,"
is not considered.
38. See B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 140 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as B. CHRISTENSEN].
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the client knew the reputations of local attorneys. 9 Today, a
more transient society and an increasingly complex and spe-
cialized system of law make the selection process more diffi-
cult.4 Of course, an attorney may yield to the temptation to
overstate his expertise when the client seeks the attorney, but
assuming arguendo that a competitive atmosphere in which
attorneys openly vie for clients does indeed encourage puffing,
Rule 23(a)(4) can be used to provide protection to a potential
client in a class action situation.
Rule 23(a)(4) states one of the four prerequisites for main-
taining a class action: "the representative parties [must]
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Any
trial judge who is not satisfied that this requirement is met can
refuse to certify the suit as a class action. The ability of the
representative to protect the class interests"' is a crucial factor
because of the binding effect of a judgment on all class mem-
bers. Representation cannot be adequate if the attorney for the
named plaintiffs is unable to manage the suit.
There are many reported cases in which the adequacy of
counsel has been subjected to close examination. For example,
in Walker v. Columbia University,4 the court denied class ac-
tion status to the plaintiffs because their attorneys failed to
make the motion for class status quickly, as required by a local
rule. The court concluded that this failure in the face of an
unambiguous rule indicated that the attorneys would not fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class in accordance
with Rule 23(a)(4). 3
In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank & Trust Co., 11 the
court saw a potential ethical impropriety when it appeared that
there might have been solicitation and maintenance of the suit
by the plaintiffs' attorneys. The court granted a defense motion
to conduct discovery to determine whether the attorneys had
demonstrated ethical inadequacy. The decision articulated a
broad principle of judicial responsibility in class actions:
In assessing the ability of the plaintiffs' counsel to carry
out his fiduciary duties to absent class members we think
39. ABA CODE, E.C. 2-6.
40. Id. 2-7.
41. Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 535 (1969).
42. 62 F.R.D. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
43. Id. at 64.
44. 60 F.R.D. 634 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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the court should use its "broad administrative, as well as
adjudicative power" as "guardian of the rights of the ab-
sentees" to see that the absentees are represented by coun-
sel who is ethically as well as intellectually competent to
represent them.45
This principle is applicable to situations such as puffing that
are more truly detrimental to the plaintiffs' interests than the
alleged misconduct in Staurides. Nor is it only the exceptional
case in which courts have felt compelled to examine the qualifi-
cations of the plaintiffs' attorneys in applying Rule 23(a)(4)."
If solicitation rules were liberalized in the class action con-
text, judges would need to be even more active in their perusal
of an attorney's qualifications when he represented a class.
This is not to suggest that judges should act as a rating bureau
for lawyers. Rather, the mechanism can be used to provide
clients with adequate protection against attorneys who grossly
overstate their ability. Furthermore, Rule 23(c)(1)4" provides
that the court may alter or amend the order certifying the class
action. Thus, the judge may modify the order and revoke class
status for failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4) if the attorney demon-
strates incompetence during the course of the suit. Protection
is thus afforded without resort to a ban on solicitation.
If the assumption that soliciting attorneys misrepresent
their abilities more than non-soliciting attorneys do is incor-
rect, the "puffing" argument fails as a reason to prohibit solici-
tation; if it is accurate, Rule 23(a)(4) would act as a protection
for the client. Given the uncertainty of the assumption, it is
reasonable to utilize the protection which the rule offers in any
event.
Rule 23(e): The "sell-out" problem. The charge is often
made that soliciting attorneys will charge higher fees than non-
soliciting attorneys, or that they will be more willing to settle
their clients' claims for less than they are realistically worth."
The basis for this charge is the assumption that soliciting
45. Id. at 637 (footnotes omitted).
46. See Cullen v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 441, 447-48 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Shields
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-51 (D. Ariz. 1971).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be
so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
48. Note, Legal Ethics-Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 185 (1955).
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would, of economic necessity, reduce the practice of law to just
another commercial enterprise, with increased emphasis on
profit maximization and decreased emphasis on justice and the
public interest. Law would become a high volume, low margin,
quick turnover enterprise. The harm to the client occurs when
an aggressive solicitor tries to maximize his own income by
agreeing to a quick settlement of the plaintiffs' claims for an
amount less than could be obtained with a greater expenditure
of time and effort.
Section 23(e) states that "[a] class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs." When
class members receive advance notice of the proposed settle-
ment and the court exercises its independent judgment, the
possibility of the attorney selling out his clients for his own gain
is greatly reduced. Courts have examined and disapproved dis-
missals even when both the named plaintiffs and the defen-
dants have stipulated to the settlement. For example, in
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co.,"
the court refused to approve a settlement of the class claims
totaling more than four million dollars and acceptable to the
named plaintiffs and three of the thirteen defendants, because
notice had not been sent the absent class as required by Rule
23(e). No class had yet been certified, but the court assumed
that the suit was a class action for purposes of dismissal or
compromise under Rule 23(e). The existence of a class that can
object to the settlement, and the requirement of court ap-
proval, make it harder for an attorney litigating a class action
to sell the claim too cheaply, even if he can persuade his client
to agree.
In City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the settle-
ment approved by the district court. Although the lower court's
approval of the settlement was affirmed, the appellate court
did state that "[t]he Court must eschew any rubber stamp
approval [of the proposed settlement] in favor of an indepen-
dent evaluation."'" The court of appeals also listed with ap-
49. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). For further discussion, see text accompanying
note 67 infra.
50. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
51. Id. at 462.
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proval the factors considered by the district court in its deci-
sion to approve the settlement:
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the liti-
gation; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; (3)
the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed; (4) the risks of establishing damages; (5) the
risks of maintaining the class action through the trial; (6)
the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater
judgment; (7) the range of reasonableness of the settle-
ment fund in light of the best possible recovery; (8) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.2
Although each factor is difficult to evaluate with any de-
gree of precision, a court, exercising its independent judgment,
can disapprove any settlement that appears to be a sellout by
the attorneys. Thus, the class action rule again provides protec-
tion to solicited (and unsolicited) plaintiffs without prohibition
of all solicitation.
A corollary concern is the enormous fees that plaintiffs'
attorneys sometimes collect in class action litigation, to the
detriment of both their clients and the defendants. These fees,
it is claimed, are not justified by either the effort expended or
the risk involved in the litigation, but constitute an unjustified
extension of the contingent fee arrangement to situations be-
yond those envisioned when the fee arrangement was originally
allowed.
Rule 23 has no fee provision. The basis for awarding attor-
neys' fees in class action cases is the equitable fund doctrine,
which provides fair allowances for expenses and fees to those
parties promoting the litigation. The doctrine is a judicially
created outgrowth of the traditional equity powers of the fed-
eral courts.53
The courts, to fulfill their duty to guide the litigation,
must scrutinize the size of the attorneys' fees award. A good
example of such scrutiny can be found in the Grinnell deci-
sion.54 In that case the plaintiffs' attorneys sought a fee of 1.5
million dollars. The court noted that this represented an hourly
rate of $635 per attorney-hour for the 2357 hours expended. The
court did not find persuasive the attorneys' attempt to justify
52. Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 469.
54. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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this fee by comparing the Grinnell case to one in which the rate
of compensation was $3,590 per hour.55 This type of active pol-
icing of attorneys' fees would obviate much of the criticism
directed at solicitation of class actions.
The Manual for Complex Litigation: Misleading
communications. To this point, the objections examined and
discussed apply (though not with equal validity or weight)
whether the litigation is a class action or an individual suit.
Because a class action includes non-formal parties-that is,
class members who are not named plaintiffs-there is one as-
pect of solicitation peculiar to the class action. Normally, an
attorney would solicit one person to initiate individual litiga-
tion. In the class action context, this is analogous to soliciting
named plaintiffs for an action not yet instituted. Solicitation
of the first named plaintiff seems to be clearly proscribed by
the present rules,5" and solicitation of additional named plain-
tiffs is also barred.57 However, in a class action situation there
may be a number of persons who have a relationship to a pend-
ing action by virtue of their status as class members. Thus, the
possibility exists that attorneys conducting the class action
might, after litigation had begun, contact actual or potential
class members and either solicit direct representation, or at-
tempt to set up funding or fee arrangements for the pending
suit.5"
The federal Manual for Complex Litigation proposes that
each court
adopt a local rule forbidding unapproved direct or indirect
written and oral communications by formal parties or their
counsel with potential and actual class members, who are
not formal parties, provided that such proposed written
communications submitted to and approved by order of
55. 495 F.2d at 472-73 n.13.
56. See, e.g., ABA CODE, D.R. 2-104.
57. Id. (a)(5). The attorney is permitted to contact but not solicit a second
potential named plaintiff. ABA CODE, D.R. 2-104(a)(5) states that "[ilf success in
asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action is
dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek
employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining this joinder." The
fineness of the distinction in allowing attorneys to contact potential class members
about joinder and to accept their offer of employment, but not to actively seek employ-
ment, may be difficult to maintain in practice. Consequently, this may result in
increased non-sanctioned solicitation.
58. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.41 (1973).
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court may be distributed to the parties or parties desig-
nated or described in the court order of approval."
The Manual acknowledges that some communication may be
necessary between the attorney and the unnamed class mem-
bers if the litigation is to function properly. However, the pro-
tections are deemed necessary because the existence of a pend-
ing suit presents an opportunity for the attorney to mislead
class members by implying that the communication has the
sanction of the court; referring to the judge by name,
mentioning the title of the court, the action, or other judicial
processes could easily lend a spurious "official" tone to the
communication ."
The Manual does not distinguish between misleading
statements by an attorney and the perceived ethical impro-
priety of solicitation itself. If solicitation is not inherently
unethical, then prior approval by the court is useful only to the
extent that it prevents misleading statements. There is some
danger that a judge may prohibit statements that are not mis-
leading, but a prior approval requirement is a less intrusive
alternative than an outright ban on solicitation.
Rule 23(d)(2): Notice. There is yet another protection for
class members which diminishes the need for a complete ban
on solicitation of class actions. Rule 23(d)(2)6 provides that
"[iln the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the
court may make appropriate orders . . . (2) requiring for the
protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
of the action." In Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp.,"2 the
defendant argued that the unnamed class members would not
59. Id. (emphasis in original). The Manual supports this prior restraint by rea-
soning that first amendment rights are to be balanced against the right to a fair trial.
Id. n.28.
60. Id. § 1.41.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) provides that in the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, a court may make appropriate orders
requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action,
or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of mem-
bers to signify whether they consider the representation fair and ade-
quate, to intervene and present claims and defenses, or otherwise to come
into the action. . ..
62. 67 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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be adequately represented, because the named plaintiffs were
the attorney for the class suit and members of his family. It was
claimed that they could unfairly compromise the class claims
to obtain larger attorneys' fees. The court noted that it had the
final approval of any settlement under Rule 23(e), and that it
could take steps to protect the absent class members from con-
flicts of interest by requiring appropriate notice of any prof-
fered settlement under Rule 23(d)(2).6 3
Both the local rule proposed by the Manual for Complex
Litigation and Rule 23(d)(2) can be used to protect actual and
potential class members from any of the dangers inherent in
solicitation without depriving them of the benefits to be gained
by allowing attorneys actively to solicit.
Rule 23(c)(1): When is a class action a class action? The
protections afforded to solicited plaintiffs depend largely on the
effectiveness of certain sections of the class action rule. It is
important to determine when in the chronology of the case
these protections become applicable; there may be a danger
that they will never attach or will attach too late in the case to
be useful. Although the complaint will indicate that a class
action is being brought, such a suit is not necessarily treated
as a class action from the time it is filed. 4 Section 23(c)(1)
reads: "[A]s soon as practicable after the commencement of
an.action brought as a class action, the court shall determine
by order whether it is to be so maintained." If Rule 23 does not
apply before that determination is made, the value of the rule
as a shield for solicited plaintiffs is severely impaired. For pur-
poses of solicitation, one must determine whether a class action
should be treated as such from the date of its filing.
The Advisory Committee notes accompanying Rule 23
state that under 23(c)(1), the court is to determine as early as
practicable whether an action brought as a class action is to be
so maintained. "5 "A negative determination means that the
action should be stripped of its character as a class action." 6
One inference which can be drawn, of course, is that the suit
should be treated as a class action for purposes of the other
63. Id. at 100.
64. Many lawsuits with class allegations are terminated before any ruling on
class status is made. American Bar Foundation Class Action Study (prelim. unpub-
lished data).




sections of Rule 23 unless and until the negative determination
is made.
A case frequently cited for the proposition that a suit is to
be treated as a class action from the time of filing is
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co."
In that case, a proposed settlement of the class claims reached
by the named plaintiffs and three of 13 defendants was ordered
held in abeyance because no notice could be given to the class,
as required by Rule 23(e). The class could not be notified be-
cause no class had been determined or even identified to the
court. Nevertheless, because the suit had been filed initially as
a class action, the court felt obliged to delay any decision on
the settlement offer until after class status had been granted
or denied, and the rights of potential class members adequately
protected.
In 1969, a district court in New York relied on Philadelphia
Electric to hold that a class action existed even without an
explicit determination under Rule 23(c)(1).1s Consequently,
after the original named plaintiff's claim had become moot, the
court allowed members of the class to intervene as of right
under Rule 24(a),69 as persons whose interests would be affected
by the class action and would not be adequately protected by
the existing parties. Because the named plaintiff was a proper
representative of the purported class at the time he filed the
suit, and because the suit was treated as a class action from the
time it was filed, the whole action did not fail when the original
named plaintiff's case became moot.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has also ruled on the issue, at least for the limited purpose of
determining jurisdiction. In City of Inglewood v. City of Los
Angeles, 0 the court noted that it is proper for a district court
to assume that a suit is a class action in order to determine
jurisdiction. It also concluded that failure of some of the class
members to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement
should not be grounds for dismissing the entire action at the
pleading stage; the district court should instead dismiss only
those class members who did not meet the jurisdictional re-
quirement, when they became identifiable.
67. 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
68. Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
70. 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971).
1976]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In all these cases the suit was treated as a class action from
its inception, though not necessarily for all purposes. One re-
curring problem is the dismissal of the suit without the notice
that would be required under Rule 23(e) if a positive certifica-
tion ruling had been made. If an action is to be treated as class
action until there is a negative certification ruling, then the
action cannot be dismissed unless there has been Rule 23(e)
notice to the class. Some cases have so decided. Others have
ruled that notice of dismissal is not required prior to certifica-
tion. The unifying principle seems to be the court's concern for
the rights of the purported class and the prejudice, formal or
informal, that dismissal without notice would cause.
In Philadelphia Electric, the settlement of the class claims
was with prejudice and prior to any certification ruling. The
court noted the binding effect of the settlement on the class
and stated that "it is imperative that no final result be
achieved as to any party without notice to those potentially
affected thereby."7'
Another case, Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corporation,"2 did not
involve an attempted settlement of the class claims, but an
attempt by the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to strike the
class allegations prior to any ruling on certification. The court
held that Rule 23(e) prohibited dismissal of the class action
without notice to the potential class members. The purported
class (shareholders in the corporation) had received proxy ma-
terials which mentioned that the suit had been filed as a class
action, and some of them might have relied on the class suit
and refrained from filing their own actions. The court was con-
cerned that striking the class claims without notice could result
"in an unwitting forfeiture of their rights,"73 because the stat-
ute of limitations might run while the class members continued
in their reliance. The court also refused to allow dismissal of
the class allegations without notice because "with the possibil-
ity of amendment as of right, the named plaintiffs have addi-
tional leverage when negotiating for settlement of their individ-
ual claims.""7
Not all courts have declined to strike the class allegations
71. 42 F.R.D. at 328.
72. 50 F.R.D. 481 (E.D.N.C. 1970).




without notice to the class members. In Berse v. Berman,7 5
certification had been granted and conditioned upon the plain-
tiffs notifying the class and posting a $25,000 bond to cover the
costs of future notice. Two months later, the plaintiffs and
defendants submitted a stipulation that the class allegations
should be stricken, because the plaintiff could not afford to
meet the conditions of certification. The judge dismissed the
class allegations without requiring notice. While acknowledg-
ing that the purpose of notice is to protect absent class mem-
bers, the judge concluded that the likelihood of prejudice to the
class members should be determined on a case by case basis.
In this instance, the judge found that the danger of prejudice
was not significant enough to require newspaper notice,"6 be-
cause (1) the plaintiffs intended to prosecute individually, thus
permitting persons who would have been class members to in-
tervene under Rule 24 even if the statute of limitations had
run;" (2) there was no offer of settlement; and (3) the statute
of limitations had not run on three of the four claims. However,
the court did require notice in the New York Law Journal in
order to counteract the effect of the notice of certification as a
class action which had appeared there earlier.
In Elias v. National Car Rental System, Inc.," the named
plaintiff instructed his attorney not to oppose a motion to dis-
miss to be filed by the defendants. The defendants filed the
motion, but requested that it not be granted unless there was
notice to the purported class. The opinion states,
The court does not perceive it has any duty to notify those
whom plaintiff's counsel might claim to be class members
of the proposed dismissal. Rule 23 does not require notice
under these circumstances and to do so is in a sense merely
soliciting a client for plaintiff's counsel under the aegis of
the court. This would be improper.
The court made inquiry of counsel and has noted the
statement by defendants' counsel in the brief on file and
is satisfied that this is not a case where plaintiff has been
75. 60 F.R.D. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This case was decided prior to American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). In American Pipe, the Court stated, "We
are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must
be that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limita-
tions as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the
action been permitted to continue as a class action." Id. at 554.
76. 60 F.R.D. at 417.
77. Id.
78. 59 F.R.D. 276 (D. Minn. 1973).
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"bought off" or some side settlement has been made with
him. Further, it is clear that a dismissal of the case, with-
out prejudice, is yet well within any statute of limitations
if plaintiff's counsel has another plaintiff and wishes to
start anew. No prejudice can result thereby and to date no
other member of the proposed class has attempted to inter-
vene nor is there any showing that anyone is relying on the
pendency of this present action.'
As these cases demonstrate, courts tend to decide the app-
licability of the notice requirements of Rule 23(e) on a case by
case basis. If the court perceives a harm to the class which Rule
23 is capable of preventing, the court will apply the rule even
though there has not been a formal ruling on class status. If the
court does not perceive such harm, the case is treated as an
individual suit until formal class certification.
The same approach should apply in the solicitation con-
text. If solicitation of class actions is allowed, then those provi-
sions of Rule 23 which protect against solicitation abuses
should become effective, in the court's discretion, at the time
they become pertinent. Class action status need not be ac-
corded for all purposes from the time of filing-only for the
limited purpose of protecting the class members from the
abuses of solicitation.
If the solicitation rules are liberalized, it does not follow
that all class actions will involve solicitation. It is therefore
necessary to have some system to notify the judge that solicita-
tion has taken place. In some instances, the court can rely on
the defendant's attorney to reveal the plaintiff's ethical lapses.
But often the defendant will not be aware of any improper
conduct, or will not be opposed to it. For example, counsel for
defendant presumably would have no objection to the plain-
tiff's attorney selling the class claim too cheaply. To forestall
such possibilities, the court might well require an affidavit by
the soliciting attorney at the time the class suit is filed, stating
whether solicitation had taken place or would take place. The
affidavit would alert the court and defense attorneys of the
existence of the solicitation and the possible need for the extra
protections afforded by Rule 23, triggering the court's active
role in preventing abuses.
79. Id. at 277.
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Defendants
Opponents of solicitation claim that defendants would be
forced to defend or settle many frivolous claims that would not
have been brought without solicitation. If solicitation of one
client is bad, solicitation en masse must be even worse. At least
this is the reasoning of those who urge that solicitation of class
actions is particularly dangerous because of the potentially
large liability and cost of defense. It is argued that class actions
are a weapon with which to blackmail defendants, and solicita-
tion would hone that weapon to razor edge.
Emotion laden terms such as "blackmail" are not a substi-
tute for a careful examination of the claim. Professor Handler
speaks of the in terrorem effect caused by the existence of a
class action rule. 5 If we make certain simplifying assump-
tions,' we can examine this effect and its relationship to the
class action rule and solicitation.
Blackmail without solicitation. The additional pressure on
defendants to settle which occurs solely because of the exist-
ence of a class action rule is equal to the probability that the
defendants will lose on the merits multiplied by the number of
plaintiffs (both named plaintiffs and class members) who
would not bring suit without a class action rule, multiplied in
turn by the average size of each claim, plus the difference be-
tween cost of defending the class suit and cost of defending
individual suits. 2 As the probability that the defendant will
80. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1971).
81. These assumptions are that the defendants will act in an economically ra-
tional manner based on information known to them, that all plaintiffs have the same
size average claim, and that, if judgment is awarded, all class members will collect
the full amount due them so that the award is exhausted.
82. The increased pressure to settle (IP) caused by the existence of the class
action rule is the difference between the expected cost of losing the class action (Ec)
and the expected cost of losing all the individual suits which would be brought in the
absence of a class action rule (El). This is symbolized as follows:
IP = Ec - E i = LS (P 1 +P 2 + (Cc . Ci)
where: L = probability that the defendant will lose the suit on the merits if it goes
to trial;
S = average size of each named plaintiff's or class member's claim;
P 1 = number of named plaintiffs in the class action who would not file
individual suits in the absence of a class action rule;
P 2 = number of class members in the class action who would not file indi-
vidual suits in the absence of a class action rule;
Cc = cost to the defendant of defending the class suit;
Ci = cost to the defendant of defending all of the individual actions that
would be brought in the absence of a class action rule.
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lose approaches 100 percent, the pressure to settle caused
purely by the class action rule increases. It approaches, as a
maximum, a quantity equal to the number of plaintiffs who
would not bring suit without a class action rule, multiplied by
the average size of each claim, plus the difference in cost of
defending the class or individual actions. In some cases, the
increased pressure caused by the class action rule may actually
be zero or less, that is, an advantage to defendants caused by
a possible economy of scale in defending class actions. There
are the cases in which the savings in defense costs caused by
the economy of scale of defending is greater than the increased
expected losses caused by those plaintiffs bringing suit who
would not have litigated but for the class action.
The situations which are most likely to be called blackmail
are those in which the probability of the defendant losing on
the merits is small. But as this probability becomes smaller the
increased pressure to settle also becomes smaller. 3 Conversely,
as the probability that defendants will lose on the merits be-
comes larger, the pressure to settle becomes larger. Thus, in
fact, the class action rule promotes the efficient use of court
resources and affords a kind of rough justice in that when a
defendant is most probably legally liable, the pressure to settle
is greatest.
The effect of solicitation. Assuming that the "blackmail"
element is a problem inherent in the class action itself, what
additional factors would be introduced if solicitation of class
actions were permitted?
First, there is the possibility that additional individual
suits might be brought. This could happen if attorneys fraudu-
lently solicited individual suits under the guise of class actions,
or if suits legitimately solicited as class actions were denied
class status and then continued as individual actions. As a
practical matter, an avalanche of additional individual litiga-
tion is unlikely, and appropriate restrictions can easily be for-
mulated. 1
As mentioned earlier, there are three types of solicitations
of class members: solicitation of the entire suit including the
83. However, even if the defendant is certain to win on the merits, thus negating
much of the pressure, there may still be some in terrorem effect depending on the
relative costs of defending the class and individual actions. The larger the economy of
scale deriving from defending the class action, if any, the smaller will be the in
terrorem effect.
84. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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first named plaintiff; solicitation of additional named plaintiffs
only; and solicitation of direct representation of non-party class
members. The latter two types of solicitation do not increase
the total number of plaintiffs. The solicited persons would pre-
sumably be unnamed class members in any event, and the
effect of successful solicitation is merely to shift their status
from class member to named plaintiff, or to give them direct
legal representation by an attorney while they remain un-
named class members. However, if the solicitation effort
results in stronger named plaintiffs and better class repre-
sentation, the probability that the defendant will lose on
the merits may increase, and hence create increased pressure
to settle.
Solicitation of the entire suit, including the first named
plaintiff, has a different effect. Here, there is a class action that
would not have been brought at all but for the solicitation, and
the formulation of a class will undoubtedly increase the num-
ber of causes of action to be litigated. The net result is the in
terrorem effect. 5
Whether these various pressures to settle caused by solici-
tation are good or bad must be evaluated in the context of Rule
23. First, the extent to which allowing solicitation of class ac-
tions implements the purposes of the class action rule" must
be considered; and second, any "pressures" directly attributa-
ble to solicitation must be evaluated in light of the pressure to
settle caused by the class action rule itself. In many cases,
increased pressure to settle caused by solicitation may be small
when compared with the pressure inherent in the existence of
the class action rule. Thus, the anxiety aroused by allowing
solicitation of class actions may actually be a misplaced con-
cern over the existence of the class action rule. It is also possi-
ble that the class action rule, with or without solicitation, is not
the threat defendants perceive it to be.
Empirical evidence is required before any of the claims of
disastrous potential consequences can be substantiated. If so-
licitation is allowed, comparative data for measuring the in
terrorem effect will become available; there is no other way of
acquiring accurate information. Of course, the mere acquisi-
85. This increase in the pressure to settle is related to the provision of forum
purpose previously discussed; the pressure to settle is partly a result of increased access
to the forum. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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tion of data is no reason to conduct an experiment. The reasons
for changing the present rules are the benefits that solicitation
will confer. But once solicitation is permitted, evidence will
exist to test the arguments.
There is one final point regarding the charge of blackmail
leveled at the class action and the concept of liberalized solici-
tation rules. As mentioned, the blackmail accusation seems
most justified when the probability that the plaintiffs will pre-
vail is small, but the large number of plaintiffs and the size of
the aggregate claim makes any risk unacceptable to the defen-
dant. This situation may have been considerably ameliorated
by a recent decision. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,87 the
Supreme Court held that each class member who could be
identified with reasonable effort must receive individual notifi-
cation at the expense of the named plaintiffs. The larger the
number of identifiable class members, the larger the amount
the plaintiff must expend in notice costs. This cost factor can
reasonably be expected to act as a deterrent to the solicitation
or filing of class actions when there is only a small chance of
prevailing on the merits.
Thus, the argument that the class action context is a par-
ticularly dangerous one in which to permit solicitation may not
be accurate, either because the class action does not cause an
inordinate in terrorem effect or because solicitation of class
actions would not add significantly to whatever effect does
exist. Even assuming "terrorizing" pressure, the magnitude of
the effect must be balanced against the positive purposes to be
served by solicitation of class actions and the negative aspects
of prohibiting it.
The Courts
One frequently repeated objection to solicitation is that
the courts cannot accomodate the extra litigation that will be
produced. The basic assumptions are that we must allocate our
scarce judicial resources, and that it is better for client-
initiated suits to reach the courts. There is an assumption that
client-initiated suits are more likely to be non-fraudulent, non-
87. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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frivolous, and non-oppressive than attorney- initiated actions.
A secondary assumption is that, as a matter of policy, judicial
resources should benefit those who experience sufficient out-
rage to seek an attorney."
Christensen argues, on the other hand, that prohibition of
solicitation has the effect of allocating the litigative mecha-
nism to the strong, the wealthy, and the knowledgeable, while
discouraging litigation by the poor, the weak, and the igno-
rant." He urges that the proper objective should not be to
discourage litigation but to allocate judicial resources ration-
ally.1° This objective is hindered by the proscription on
solicitation, which does not provide a rational allocation.
What additional burden will solicitation of class actions
impose on the courts? One measure of the burden may be cal-
endar congestion; another, the cost of handling each suit; and
a third, the total cost of all suits that are brought. If the pur-
pose of the court system is to reduce the total number of plain-
tiffs in order to reduce calendar congestion or to reduce the
total cost of the court system to society, then solicitation of
class actions obviously works against these goals. If the primary
goal is not to minimize cost but to maximize access to the
courts for those who have redressable grievances-if the medie-
val notion that litigation is per se bad should be discarded by
an enlightened society 5 -then solicitation of class actions
would serve the purpose of maximizing access to the courts.
First, solicitation will increase the flow of information to
those who would not otherwise have had the knowledge or op-
portunity to redress their grievances. The objection that frivo-
lous claims would be encouraged is a questionable one and may
not withstand empirical analysis. In any event, frivolous suits
are already proscribed by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 2 Furthermore, the objection simply may not be
weighty enough to justify restricting the flow of information to
those persons who have legitimate non-trivial claims.
Second, solicitation of class actions may actually increase
judicial efficiency. It may minimize the overall cost, as a sec-
ondary result of achieving the primary purpose: maximizing
88. For a discussion and refutation of these assertions, see B. CHRISTENSEN, supra
note 38, at 142-46.
89. Id. at 143.
90. See id. at 145-46.
91. Cf. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 72 (1935).
92. ABA CODE, D.R. 2-109.
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access to the courts. The effectiveness of solicitation is tied to
the effectiveness of the class action itself. Uniting plaintiffs
with similar grievances in a single class action may reduce net
judicial resources expended.
The savings realized by consolidation may or may not be
equal to the additional costs caused by increased access. But
the primary goal of courts should not be minimization of cost.
Simple cost-cutting can be achieved in any number of arbitrary
ways; we could, for example, disallow suits by the poor or igno-
rant. The obvious unacceptability of this alternative points out
the unacceptability of reaching essentially the same result
indirectly, through anti-solicitation rules.
The Legal Profession
The arguments for and against solicitation based on its
hypothetical effects on the legal profession involve fundamen-
tal policy questions that are not affected by a class ac-
tion/individual action distinction. Christensen describes the
basic arguments as follows:
One value appears to predominate among those favor-
ing the liberalization of present restrictions: It is the bene-
fit to the public from vastly greater access to lawyers and
their services. Similarly, one value stands out as most im-
portant among those favoring the preservation of the re-
strictions in their present form: This is the value most
commonly spoken of as "preventing the commercialization
of the practice of law"-preventing impairment of the pro-
fessional milieu and thus of the lawyer's ability to perform
his difficult functions in conformance with basic profes-
sional norms.
The dichotomy is, then, a simple one: The prospect of
making lawyers' services more readily available to people
of moderate means through relaxation of the rules against
advertising and solicitation must be weighed against the
threat such modification might pose to the professional
milieu and thus to the lawyer's ability to conform to high
standards of conduct in the performance of his professional
functions. The weighing may be less simple than the di-
chotomy, however. 3
All that can be added is that for those unwilling to gamble on
the complete liberalization of anti-solicitation rules, the class
93. B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 38, at 158.
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action, with its special protections and limited scope, could
serve as a compromise testing ground for empirical evaluation
of the two positions.
The General Public
Finally, there is the claim that solicitation will diminish
public confidence in the profession by reducing the practice of
law to the level of a commercial enterprise. First, that state-
ment involves an assumption that a high level of confidence
presently exists. The public reaction to the recent Watergate
scandals and the many lawyers implicated would appear to
dispel any notion of widespread confidence in the profession.
And lest this be thought a temporary phenomenon, it is in-
structive to consider the lines written by Carl Sandburg over
50 years ago:
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?94
Assuming that the fear is of a still greater decline in public
esteem, it is submitted that the "commercial" nature of an
enterprise is not itself objectionable; rather, public cynicism is
generated when those affected by a commercial enterprise are
abused by it. The class action rule and the nature of the class
action itself offer protection against abuse for those primarily
affected by solicitation: plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts.
This, taken together with the benefits afforded by solicitation
and the utility of the approach,. should outweigh any fear of
increased loss of confidence.
IV. A BOUNDED RIGHT
Allowing attorneys to solicit class actions does not mean
that the right must or should be unrestricted. In most cases,
the courts will be able to control abuses by use of Rule 23. But
there may still be those who misuse the right.
For example, one can envision hordes of lawyers scram-
bling into hospitals and funeral parlors to sign up the victims
of mass accidents for class action litigation. No provision of
Rule 23 would operate directly to prevent or redress this
94. C. SANDBERG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SMOKE AND STEEL (1920).
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practice. However, there should be no objection to a restriction
on the time, place, and manner of solicitation, to ensure that
potential litigants will receive the benefits of solicitation with-
out being subjected to annoyance or imposition. While an at-
torney should be permitted to solicit clients, he need not be
allowed to climb, pen in hand, into an accident victim's hospi-
tal bed.
Narrowly drawn disciplinary rules for fraudulent and un-
acceptable conduct in soliciting class actions would be an ap-
propriate and reasonable adjunct to a liberalized rule. A good
starting point is the new Canon 2 proposed by one legal com-
mentator. 5 Its scope, of course, would have to be modified to
cover solicitation of class actions instead of solicitation in gen-
eral.
There is the further possibility that if solicitation of class
actions is permitted while solicitation of individual suits is not,
some attorneys would work around the edges of the distinction.
The pretense of soliciting a class suit would be used to contact
potential clients soliciting for suits that have no real possibility
of achieving class status. The attorney might comply with Rule
23(c)(1) by moving for judicial determination of class status,
fully expecting that the motion would be denied; the action
would then proceed as an individual action. A disciplinary rule
would be drawn to deal with this problem, and exposing the
fact of fraudulent solicitation would be hardly more difficult
than establishing under present rules that solicitation has oc-
curred. In fact, given the affidavit procedure described pre-
viously, it would be easier in some circumstances. The burden
of proving reasonable belief that class status could be achieved
properly would fall on the soliciting attorney, as a fair condi-
tion on allowing solicitation.
In sum, there is much to be gained by permitting attorneys
to solicit clients: solicitation would make the right of judicial
redress of grievances a more meaningful one; it would increase
the flow of information to the public, and facilitate access to
the courts. For those who are fearful that the potential abuses
95. A lawyer has the right to engage in advertising and solicitation to aid
in securing professional employment. The methods of advertising and
solicitation in which lawyers engage should not deceive the public. The
attorney-client relationship is personal and unique and should not be
established as the result of pressures and deceptions.
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Professional Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1195 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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of such a practice would overshadow any social benefits, a rule
allowing solicitation only of class action suits would be a means
of testing that proposition in a limited context. There is
authority for the move in the NAACP v. Button line of cases,
and it is clear that the class action context provides particu-
larly appropriate safeguards against the dangers of solicitation,
and enhances its benefits. In a legal system that must make the
courts a meaningful asset to all of the people, solicitation of
class actions would be a small but important step.

